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Wiggins: Florida's Motor Carrier Derregulation by Sunset: A View from the

FLORIDA'S MOTOR CARRIER DEREGULATION
BY SUNSET: A VIEW FROM THE
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION*
PATRICK K. WIGGINS* I"
INTRODUCTION

Under the Regulatory Reform Act of 1976, regulation of Florida's motor
carriers was scheduled for legislative review during the 1980 legislative
session. When the session closed, the Public Service Commission's authority
over surface transportation was terminated. The legislature failed to reenact
statutes that had previously authorized motor carrier regulation; thus, regulation was sunsetted.
This example of sunset deregulation is instructive in several respects. Unfortunately, the issue of whether or not motor carrier deregulation in Florida
will be successful remains at this point unresolved. Other conclusions, however,
may already be drawn. Some of these relate to the deregulation debate, and
some relate to the sunset process in general.
The purpose of this article is twofold. First, it provides a brief description
of the Public Service Commission's role in the legislative review of motor
carrier regulation. This includes a brief summary of the commission's proposal
for continued motor carrier regulation. The second purpose is to comment on
several lessons that someone interested in motor carrier deregulation, or the
sunset process, or both, can learn from the commission's experience.
THE ROLE OF THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION IN REVIEwING
CHAPTER 323, FLORIDA STATUTES: PREPARATION

With the informal encouragement of Florida's legislative leadership, the
Public Service Commission began an intensive review of its enabling legislation
and regulatory role in July of 1979. This review was to serve as the starting
point for any legislative reform of commission regulatory functions and was
expected to produce draft legislation. The commission's regulation of intrastate motor carriers, intrastate air carriers, radio common carriers, intrastate
railroads, telecommunication, and electric and gas utilities were all under re-

view.
The commission began by conducting informal hearings throughout the
state for the purpose of receiving public comment. Although it found con-

tinued regulation of intrastate air carriers and radio common carriers unnecessary,' the commission identified no firm consensus on the need for the
*The author is grateful to Robert T. Mann, Chairman of the Florida Public Service Commission, who read the manuscript and offered suggestions. The views expressed in this article
are those of the author and do not express the official view of the Public Service Commission,
if indeed there is one.
**B.A., Furman University, 1970; J.D., University of Florida, 1975; Legal Director, Florida
Public Service Commission; Member, Florida Bar and Georgia Bar.
1. It might be suggested that the first question should be whether a particular body of
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2
continued regulation of motor carriers. The commission, therefore, had a
number of options. It could propose that the current statutory regulation of
motor carriers3 be reenacted, either without modification, with significant
modification, or subject to a phased-in deregulation. Alternatively, it could
4
take the extreme position that the statute be "sunsetted" without alternative
legislation.
Initially, neither reenactment without modification nor sunsetting seemed
appropriate. A majority of the commissioners were firmly convinced that the
regulatory scheme needed modification, and all were concerned that sunsetting
motor carrier regulation without provision for a safety program would be irresponsible. Moreover, modification seemed more palatable to Public Service
Commission staff than any form of deregulation. Therefore, the commission
chose to devote its limited resources to developing a proposal for the reform of
Florida Statutes Chapter $23, the motor carrier regulatory framework. Nevertheless, the commission believed that it should also develop a responsible deregulation proposal as a feasable legislative alternative.
Thus, the Public Service Commission, though without a predetermined
underlying policy objective, began a step by step revision of Chapter 323. The
method for determining how to reform Chapter 323 was pragmatic and
thorough, if uninspired. The commission simply examined that chapter line
6
by line and asked, "Is there a problem here, and if so, how can it be solved?"

THE COMMISSION

PROPOSAL: REGULATORY REioIRM, OR1

SOMETHING TO DISPLEASE EvERYONE
7
The Public Service Commission's proposal, summarized below, was considered by the trucking lobby as too radical a step towards deregulation.

regulation is needed at all. Indeed, this is the approach of the sunset law, FLA. STAT. §11.61(4)
(1979), which provides in part: "(a) Would the absence of regulation significantly harm or
endanger the public health, safety, or welfare? (b) Is there a reasonable relationship between
the exercise of the state's police power and the protection of the public health, safety, or
welfare? (c) Is there another, less restrictive method of regulation available which could
adequately protect the public? (d) Does the regulation have the effect of directly or indirectly
increasing the costs of any goods or services involved and, if so, to what degree? (e) Is the increase in cost more harmful to the public than the harm which could result from the absence
of regulation? (f) Are all facets of the regulatory process designed solely for the purpose of,
and have as their primary effect, the protection of the public?"
2. Public Service Commission Chairman Mann concluded that he had heard no evidence
to overcome the statutory presumption of the sunset law, but Commissioner Mayo expressed
grave reservations about the wisdom of embracing the unknown. Commissioners Cresse, Gunter,
and Marks were undecided.
S. FLA. STAT. §§323.01-.68 (1979).
4. "Sunset," as used throughout this article, is a term of art identifying the process through
which existing legislation is terminated by its own specified term of operation unless it is reenacted.
5. The commission employed Stephen Rubin, Professor of Law, Holland Law Center,
University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida, to prepare this proposal.
6. The commission's method and ultimate proposal was consistent with the trucking
lobby's popular admonition: "If it ain't broke, don'tfix it."
7. The actual proposal was 92 pages long.
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Entry Related Changes
Under Chapter 323 of the Florida Statutes, an applicant for a certificate of
public convenience and necessity had to prove three basic propositions: that
the proposed transportation was required by the public convenience and necessity; s that he was fit and able to provide the proposed transportation; 9 and that
existing carriers in the area of the proposed transportation had failed to provide service and facilities reasonably required by the commission.1°
Under the commission's proposal the applicant's sole burden was to establish that the proposed transportation was consistent with the public convenience and necessity, and that he was fit and able to provide the proposed
transportation. A protestant could challenge the proposed transportation on
the ground that it would adversely affect existing service to the shipping public.11 But because such a challenge would be difficult to prove, the commission's
modification would have greatly relaxed industry entry. Some of the proposal's
critics complained that entry had already become too relaxed under the appointed five-member commission. Indeed, several truckers pointed to the commission's own statistics that seemed to indicate a grant rate of almost 80
percent for new applications.1 2 This statistic was somewhat misleading. 8
The key to relaxing entry was the deletion of subsection 323.03(5), an extremely restrictive provision that authorized the commission to grant competing
authority to an applicant only when the "existing certificate holder ... serving
(the) territory failed to provide service and facilities which (were) reasonably
required by the Commission."
The trucking and busing lobbies admantly urged retention of this provision.
They contended that a carrier providing adequate service under restricted
rates was entitled as part of the regulatory bargain to the right of first refusal
for new business generated by a growing market. Furthermore, these lobbies
asserted that existing carriers could serve an expanding market more efficiently
than new carriers. In rejecting this position, the commission implicitly concluded that a regulated carrier should be protected only against competition
that would impair its ability to provide transportation service to the public. It
refused to give regulated carriers a guarantee against head-to-head competition
if territory demand grew to support two or more carriers. Rather, the commis8. FLA. STAT. §323.03(4) (1979).
9. Id.
10. Id. §323.03(5).
11. The protestant would, however, have the burden of proving the allegation.
12. Of 255 applications for new or extended authority filed during the fiscal year 19781979, 206 were granted. It should be noted that these comprised applications for authority to
transport both passengers and property.
13. During the fiscal year 1978-1979, there were 136 applications for new authority to
operate as a common carrier of property. Of these only 60, or about 44%, were granted as
requested. And of eight such applications that were protested, only about 27% were granted
as requested, while about 68% of these protested applications were granted as modified. Modification, of course, reflects the resistance of existing carriers.
On the other hand, 68% of the unprotested applications for such new authority were
granted as applied for. However, this number does not indicate the number of applicants
who resolved potential protests before application.
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sion believed new business spawned by an expanding economy should be allocated to carriers according to market forces.
Relaxation of entry is central to regulatory reform and deregulation. The
negative consequences of section 323.03(5) are illustrated in the following hypothetical. Under former Chapter 323 an Orlando businessman convinced numerous private carriers that because of increasing fuel costs it was less expensive for
them to hire his company to make local deliveries than to use their own
vehicles. Upon applying for a certificate of public convenience and necessity,
the businessman would soon learn that despite his marketing efforts he might
be barred from providing these private carriers with transportation service. If
a certificated carrier was authorized to engage in such carriage in that area and
protected this proposed service, the applicant would be granted authority only
if he could prove that the carrier's service was inadequate. The entrepreneurial
activity of the businessman, not disenchantment with existing service, more
probably created the market for the businessman's services. Section 323.03(5),
however, failed to take into account the actual source of the new demand for
transportation service. A regulatory structure must allow supply to be sensitive
to demand and potential demand in the marketplace. Otherwise, creative risk
taking is stifled, and ultimately the system will become lethargic.
The commission proposed that the provisions concerning the grant of certificates of public convenience and necessity be modified to accomplish two
additional goals. First, the chapter would have expressly stated that the certificate's grant of authority imposed a co-extensive obligation to provide transportation service. Second, certain ground rules would have been established for
defining the scope of the authority granted and the obligation imposed by the
certificates of public-convenience and necessity.
To accomplish this second goal, the commission proposed that in issuing a
certificate of public convenience and necessity it would consider the following
general prindples: 4
1. When a carrier is authorized and obligated to operate anywhere
within a county, it should be authorized and obligated to provide
service everywhere within the county that its services are needed, unless a lesser service area is in the public interest.16
14. The inclusion of these general principles in the proposal touched off a spirited debate
concerning the appropriateness of including such general policy statements in a statute. The
non-lawyer commissioners, Cresse, Gunter and Mayo, believed such inclusion to be appropriate.
Chairman Mann and Commissioner Marks, both of whom are attorneys, believed that such
statements should be expressed in rules. These two argued that the commission might find it
useful to modify the principles in the future, or perhaps add to them. This process is made

more difficult if the agency must go to the legislature for approval of such changes. Attorneys
for motor carriers seemed to agree with this view. After some discussion, the non-lawyer commissioners did not seem to violently oppose placing these principles in rules, as long as the
legislative history indicated that such rules were contemplated.
15. All but the last of these principles deal with what Commissioner Cresse termed the
problem of "silly restrictions" on operating authority. The process under FLA. STAT. §§323.01-.68
(1979) of allowing existing carriers to protest applications enabled them to impose restrictions
on the applicant's authority. If the applicant would agree to restrictions designed to protect
the protestant's revenues, then the protestant would withdraw its protest. If not, the applicant
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2. When a carrier is authorized and obligated to operate between two
everypoints it should be authorized and obligated to provide service
16
where between those two points that its services are needed.
3. When a freight carrier is authorized and obligated to transport a particular commodity it should transport every other commodity within
the class into which that commodity falls, so long as the related combe appropriately transported by the carrier's motor
modity may
7
vehicles.1

4. The commission should not limit the type and number of motor
vehicles a motor carrier may use in its operations.
5. The commission should have authority to control locations of terminals and their abandonment.' 8
The commission also proposed that entry into the charter bus business be
relaxed. The lucrative charter business was restricted under the old statute to
those firms who also provided regular route service. Ostensibly, this provision
allowed carriers to offer regular route service at reduced rates. The commission
proposed abolition of this restriction so that entry into the charter bus business
would be regulated like any other carriage operation.
Rate Changes
Proposed modifications would have specifically allowed the commission to
adopt a "band of acceptability" or "zone of reasonableness" approach to rate
setting. Under this approach, the commission would have set minimum and
maximum rates within which carriers would be free to set their own rates. Of
course, the carrier would have to file its rates with the commission and then
apply them uniformly to all shippers.
The modified statute' 9 would have also authorized the Public Service Commission to establish generic authority for commodity transportation and for
rate structures based on actual costs involved in transporting the various
classes of commodities. For example, carriers authorized to transport paper
towels could also transport napkins, cotton balls, and all other similar products,
and a uniform rate would be charged for transporting any of these goods.
Specific changes in ratemaking methods were not mandated by the proposal but
were merely authorized.
Safety Related Changes
It was proposed that the statute20 be modified to subject certificated carriers,
would have to meet the burden of proving that "public convenience and necessity" required
its proposed service.
16. This would end "closed door" restrictions on a carrier's authority. Often the vehicles
of intercity carriers would have to pass empty through points with available cargo because
the certificate specifically restricted its authority at such points.
17. This would end certain commodity restrictions that, for example, would forbid a
carrier from transporting cotton balls while allowing it to transport tissue paper.
18. Some carriers objected to this principle as bureaucratic meddling, on the ground that
it would give the commission authority to interfere with managerial decisions.
19. Rates were formerly regulated pursuant to FLA. STAT. §323.08 (1979).
20. FLA. STAT. §§323.01-.68 (1979) gave the PSC the authority to regulate intrastate carriers
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exempt carriers, and private carriers to the same safety regulations. Under

former Chapter 323 regulated intrastate carriers and registered interstate carriers were subject to federal safety rules enforced by commission investigators.
Exempt and private intrastate carriers were, however, subject to less satisfactory
safety standards. 21 The commission proposal would have given it authority to

enforce safety provisions against exempt, private and regulated carriers through
fines and injunctions.
Revenue Related Changes
The commission proposed to abandon the system of road taxes and cab
cards 22 in favor of a regulatory fee based on the gross intrastate receipts generated by certificated carriers. The fee would have been due semi-annually.

Penalties for failure to pay or delinquency in paying would have been imposed
in a manner similar to that employed in sales tax enforcement. Cab cards and
road taxes would have been retained for purposes of interstate reciprocity.
as to safety. It had five specific provisions pertaining to safety: (1) Vehicles of regulated carriers were bound by the weight and size limitations of FLA. STAT. §§316.515, .535. Id. §323.11;
(2) Vehicles of regulated carriers were to obey the state's speed laws. Id. §323.12; (3) The
statute authorized the commission to prescribe equipment required on the vehicles of regulated
motor carriers, and established the minimum amount of equipment the commission would
require. Id. §323.13; (4) Drivers of the vehicles of regulated carriers must be at least 18 years
of age and qualified to drive. Id. §323.18; (5) The commission was required to adopt the
maximum number of hours a driver could drive. Id.
To more fully regulate carrier safety, the commission adopted certain substantive rules
under the several categories of safety regulation. But except for minor exceptions, these rules
were the same as the very detailed regulations promulgated by the U.S. Department of Transportation in 49 C.F.R. § §390-97 (1980).
21. The Florida Uniform Traffic Control Law, FLA. STAT. §§316.001-.660 (1979), establishes
the basic rules of the road for all motor vehicles. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §316.261 (1979) (establishes the brake equipment required for various kinds of vehicles); FLA. STAT. §316.271 (1979)
(establishes requirements for horns and other audible warning devices).
The legislature has also addressed the problem of the physical condition of motor vehicles.
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §§325.01-.10 (1979) (the state is authorized to enter into compacts with
other states on safety standards for vehicles); FLA. STAT. §§325.11-.33 (1979) (provides for the
safety inspection of every motor vehicle xequired to be registered with the state). The Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles (DHSMV) has issued detailed rules with respect
to these inspections. See generally FLA. ADMIN. CoDE 125-11.
The safety inspection law provides that vehicles operating under certificates of public
convenience and necessity issued by the ICC or by the PSC (both of which would thus be
subject to the U.S. Departmet of Transportations safety regulations) are exempt from the
requirement of displaying a safety inspection sticker. See FLA. STAT. §325.28 (1979). Thus,
under the former regulatory scheme, DHSMV deferred to the PSC and the ICC for insuring
the safe physical condition of the motor vehicles of motor carriers.
Most persons familiar with trucking safety programs consider the above chapters inferior
to the federal safety regulations promulgated by the U.S. Department of Trafisportation.
This judgment is apparently based on two considerations. First, the federal safety regulations
are much more detailed than are Chapters 316 and 325. Second, these chapters address the
conditions of motor vehicles, not the condition of drivers, unlike the federal standards which
address both.
22. The regulation of motor carriers was financed primarily through the imposition of a
road tax on the vehicles of the motor carriers, and by selling identification devices in lieu of

the road tax. FA. STAT. §§323.15, .22 (1979).
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Exemption Changes
The following carriage would have been added to the list of exemptions in
section 323.29:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Armored car services
Sand and aggregate haulers
Taxi cabs
Car pooling
Wreckers
All unprocessed livestock, fish, agricultural and horticultural products
Mass transit
Housemoving
Transportation for U.S. Government

Of the above proposed exemptions, the first two proved to be the most controversial. Both armored car services and aggregate haulers had been regulated
as to entry. For different reasons, however, neither industry had been the subject of rate regulation. Early in the review of Chapter 323, the commission concluded that to regulate entry without also regulating rates was an unsatisfactory
situation; the result was to fail to regulate at all, because it artifically created
an oligopoly and provided no check on unreasonably high rates. The commis23
sion, therefore, proposed to exempt both these industries from regulation.
Miscellaneous Changes
1. Transportation Brokers
Transportation brokers are individuals who match shippers with carriers
for a fee. Most of the carriage procurred through them was exempt interstate
agricultural carriage. These brokers were licensed, and those firms holding
motor carrier certificates were ineligible. To receive a transportation broker's
license, an applicant had to establish that his proposed service would be consistent with the public convenience and necessity and demonstrate requisite experience and financial worth. Moreover, the statute specifically directed the
commission to consider the overall effect of the proposed service upon the
transportation brokerage industry before issuing a license.24
Under the proposed change, transportation brokers would still have been
licensed, but the license would be issued as a matter of right to qualified applicants. Further, there would be no requirement that the applicant establish
that the proposed service would meet the public convenience and necessity
standard. The qualified broker applicant would have had only to demonstrate
minimal experience in motor carrier transportation and post a substantial performance bond.2
23. The commission was willing to fully regulate either of these segments of the industry
if they would acquiesce in rate regulation.
24. FLA. STAT. §323.22 (1979).
25. By rule, the commission would have had authority to prescribe the form of contracts,
bills of lading and other documents used by brokers and to require that copies be furnished to
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2. Freight Forwarders
Freight forwarders consolidate small shipments into truckload and carload
quantities. For this service, they charge the customer an amount more than the
shipping rate for the carload or truckload but less than would be charged if
the goods were shipped in less than truckload amounts.
Freight forwarders were certificated in a manner similar to motor carriers.
An additional entry restriction, however, was that no warehouseman or manufacturer could serve as a freight forwarder unless grandfathered in.26 Since
warehousemen and manufacturers were the firms most able to operate economically as freight forwarders, this restriction virtually precluded new entry.
Under the proposed change, anyone except a motor carrier could have operated
as a freight forwarder.
3. Sale of Certificates
Any transfer of a certificate had required commission approval. 2 7 Under
the proposed revision, the commission could not approve a sale of all or a
portion of a certificate apart from other assets of a carrier's business. This
modification was intended to prevent the marketing of unused authority as a
separate commodity.
4. Collective Rates
Under the proposal, groups or associations of carriers could join together
in rate proceedings before the commission. This was intended to ensure that
the use of rate bureaus 28 did not violate state antitrust laws. It should be noted,
however, that the rate proposals would have relegated the commission's function to that of a publishing house.
THE

COMMISSION BEFORE THE LEGISLATURE

The commission's preparatory work did not end with formulation of the
above proposal. Both houses of the legislature had sent extensive questionnaires

all parties. The commission would prohibit collection of any charge or fee not set forth in
the contract. This provision was proposed to provide protection to truckers from the unethical
practices of some brokers. These brokers would quote a lower contract price to the trucker
than agreed to by the shipper. Since the trucker was paid a percentage of the quoted contract
price, the broker would "skim" the difference between the quoted price and actual price.
Brokers vehemently objected to this proposal. According to these brokers: (a) the proposal
would not work because most- transactions were arranged by telephone without face-to-face
contact; (b) "skimming" was not a serious problem in the industry; and (c) it amounted to
unnecessary meddling in their business affairs.
26. FLA. STAT. §§323.51-.68 (1979).
27. Id. §323.041.
28. Nothing in Chapter 323 formally recognized the right of rate bureaus to function as
the instruments of collective ratemaking. The commission was authorized, however, to have
"tariff filing rules similar to those of the Interstate Commerce Commission," which rules do
recognize rate bureaus. Id. §323.08(2)(a).
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to be completed,29 although unfortunately the commission did not have the
information readily available to answer many questions about the nature of its
regulation and the industry it was supposed to regulate. The commission also
participated in numerous hearings of both the senate and the house before and
during the 1980 general session.
In neither chamber, however, was its proposed revision of motor carrier
regulation well received. The Senate Commerce Committee appeared to be in
step with the trucking lobby from the start. At the hearing in which that committee voted on changes to be made in Chapter 323, the committee routinely
embraced the trucking lobby's view, or to phrase it conversely, rejected the
Public Service Commission's proposal. 30
The commission's proposal was also looked at askance before the House
Committee on Regulatory Reform. The philosophic bent of the committee was
hostile to regulation. This hostility was reflected in the tendency of committee
members to demand justification for regulation before even considering proposals for the reform of Chapter 323. This attitude was to some extent attributable to the basic premise of sunset review and to the composition of the committee. It was, however, also attributable to the fact that these hearings occurred after April 9, 1980, the date the senate produced an unwieldy bill
which so liberalized entry that it became a powerful instrument of deregulation. There was then no real reason to consider the Public Service Commission
proposal, and indeed, little consideration was given to it.31
LESSONs LEARNED DURING SUNSET REvIEW

The Public Service Commission's experience in the sunset of Chapter 323
teaches certain valuable lessons pertaining to issues of motor carrier deregulation and to the process of sunset review of a regulatory agency.
29. Indeed, the questionnaire of the House Committee on Regulatory Reform was sufficiently extensive to be deemed onerous. Over 1,000 man hours were spent on answering their

questions.
30. In fact, halfway through that hearing an attorney for the trucking lobby turned to the
author and said, "You know we actually agree with you on that point." The response was
terse and sincere, "Don't tell me, tell them." He did, and that proposal of the commission was
one of the very few endorsed by the committee.
Perhaps the most discouraging moment came when one of the senators half-seriously asked

the author not to speak for an amendment the senator supported. He feared that the commission's low credibility would undermine his attempt to get the amendment approved. The
senator was correct in his assessment of the commission's credibility but his explantion of
the problem was bizarre. The commission, he explained, was abusing the sunset process by
using it
only to
31.
to note
because

as a vehicle for regulatory reform. That process was intended, he further explained,
determine whether certain agency programs should be continued.
In light of the lukewarm reception given the commission's proposal, it is interesting
that the staff of both committees acknowledged that the proposal had merit. Further,
the Senate Commerce Committee apparently regarded the commission proposal as
too radical, the staff report of that committee, STAFF OF THE FLORIDA SENATE COMMERCE COMMrrrEE, A REVIEW OF CHAPTER 323, FLORIDA STATUTES, MOTOR CARRIERS AND FREIGHT FORWARDERS
7 (January 1980) is reassuring. The report explicitly endorsed a majority of the commission's
specific proposals for improving Chapter 323. In some instances, however, the staff would have
moved closer to deregulation than the commission believed prudent. For example, the staff
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Two Lessons on Trucking Deregulation
1. Beware the Illusion of the Monolithic Entity
During the deregulation debate, people tended to assume that there was a
perspective on deregulation common to the trucking industry as a whole. In
Florida, however, 2,528 intrastate carriers of 25,408 interstate carriers were
regulated. The size of these carriers varied tremendously. Some regulated carriers were small family owned and operated businesses, while others were large
corporations. It was simplistic to assum that these thousands of carriers would
speak with a common voice. It may be more efficient for the Florida Trucking
Association or Florida Associated Industries to speak for all of its members
than to have the members speak individually. To do so, however, is to compress
a wide range of views into one purportedly representative view. It should be
remembered that the lobbyist for the membership may not be presenting the
views of all his organization's members. To avoid a distorted impression, the
policymaker should seek to identify the method by which the representative
view was developed.
Similarly, the policymaker should remember that often an organization does
not represent all persons with apparently similar interests. For example, the
Florida Motor Passenger Transportation Association represented a majority of
the passenger carriers within the state. When a representative for Florida Motor
Passenger Transportation Association spoke for continued regulation, one
could generally regard his comments as representative of that industry. Yet,
several smaller passenger carriers organized themselves under the name Florida
Association of Competitive Passenger Carriers, Inc. and aggressively lobbied
for deregulation. The reason for their organization was that Florida Motor
Passenger Transportation Association did not and perhaps could not speak for
their needs.
2. Do Not Expect Sophisticated Levels of Debate
One of the more frustrating aspects of the debate on deregulation was that
it did little to answer the host of questions raised in the sunset process. The
opponents and proponents of deregulation often found no common ground on
which to do battle. Proponents of deregulation believed that we would have a
more efficient transportation system if market forces were allowed to define its
structure.
Proponents of regulation, however, felt some kind of regulatory framework
was necessary to a stable, effective, and safe transportation system. Given the
fact that a sound transportation system is important to a healthy Florida, they
argued that market forces were too frenetic to serve as the foundation for a
strongly questioned the appropriateness of using "need for the service" as a criterion for granting a certificate. Although the staff was careful not to declare that only fitness should be considered in granting a certificate, that proposition is clearly implied by the text. Id. at 37. It
also suggested that the effect of the proposed transportation service on existing services was

not an appropriate criterion. Id. Moreover, the staff proposal recommended that the rate
bureau should be eliminated because cartel pricing discourages price competition and thus
raises prices. Id. at 58.
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stable system. Most advocates of regulation readily admitted that the existing
system was flawed. But they pointed out that motor carriers and shippers had
adjusted to these flaws, and that the system had succeeded in serving the needs
of the state. Regulation's proponents would, at a minimum, have opted for its
apparent workability rather than abandon it in favor of a system whose problems were unknown and perhaps inimical to the economic welfare of the state.
Unfortunately the defenders of the previous system never seemed to move beyond mere assertion.
Similarly, the commission heard no meaningful testimony in support of the
proposition that there was healthy competition among carriers in Florida. It
had been hoped that at least one carrier would identify a market in which he
operated and then describe how the pressure of competition spurred him on to
better performance. The absence of such testimony did not mean that there
were insufficient levels of carrier competition within Florida. It simply meant
that there was no basis in the record from which to conclude that competitive
forces within the marketplace were at work to insure shippers adequate service.
This kind of information would have been extremely helpful to the commission
in making its recommendation on possible relaxation of entry barriers. The
absence of such information rendered the results of the commission's sunset
hearings largely unsatisfying.
Truckers opposed to deregulation based their convictions on both personal
experience and the belief that the system worked satisfactorily. These persons
had devoted much of their lives to providing motor carrier service, and believed
that in doing so they have served the state well. Someone who has been in the
trucking business for a long time considers deregulation not only a potential
threat to his financial welfare, but a direct criticism of the quality of service he
has provided.
In summary, the arguments on deregulation were stated in two different
languages. Deregulators presented their arguments in conceptual terms, the
language of the classroom. Pro-regulators, mostly existing carriers, spoke in
human terms about their fears for the state and for their own economic welfare
after having invested so heavily in the current system.
Moreover, the two sides in the deregulation controversy based their arguments on different assumptions and value judgments. Proponents of regulation
assumed that the perceived stability of the present system was more important
to the state's economic health than the supposed advantages of a free market
system. Deregulators, however, emphasized two principles that seem basic to
our notions of government: that government should accord to its citizens the
greatest possible opportunity for self-advancement, and that government should
reward and encourage successful risk-taking in the marketplace. To deregulators, freedom from regulation was freedom of opportunity and freedom to take
economic risks for the promise of economic gain. Deregulators viewed the
promotion of these freedoms as essential to economic vitality and, thus, more
important than maintaining the perceived stability of our transportation system.
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FLORIDA'S MOTOR CARRIER DEREGULATION

A Short Lesson for Agencies Scheduled for Sunset Review:
Be Preparedand Start Early
When faced with sunset review, the most useful preparation an agency can
undertake is to achieve an informed view in its regulatory function. The commission had vast amounts of information available to it about the motor carrier
industry. Much of this information, however, was not readily usable. For example, when the Committee on Regulatory Reform inquired about the percentage of applications for certificates granted, the commission staff was required to review some 5,000 documents to ascertain the information. The
commission, while able to accomplish this at some inconvenience, should have
had that information available upon request.32
An agency may be wise to dispense with public hearings. This is not to
suggest that the agency cavalierly disregard the views of those it regulates or
any other members of the public. Instead, however, the agency must recognize
the inherent limitations of such hearings. The agency should solicit comment
from interested persons in writing rather than in person.
The agency should also give some thought to its proper role in the sunset
process. Many persons, including some within the commission, criticized the
aggressive stance the commission took before the legislature. These persons
felt the commission should have sought to give the legislature the benefit of its
technical expertise, not the benefit of its policy advice. It has been suggested
that it would have been more appropriate had the commission provided requested information only, rather than lobbied actively for its own proposals.
This criticism may have been prompted by the commission's status as a legislative agency. Nonetheless, for reasons of both principle and politics, it is a question even judicial and executive agencies should consider before facing deregulation.
32. To accomplish this kind of preparation takes time. In the commission's case, we
should have started two years before the 1980 legislative session.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol32/iss5/5

12

